The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so-called Texas Shootout s, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real-world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.
Introduction
It is very common for closely-held business ventures, including limited liability companies (LLCs) and partnerships, to contain buy-sell provisions in their operating agreements. These clauses provide an exit mechanism for owners who no longer wish to participate in the business venture.
One popular exit mechanism is the so-called "Texas Shootout," a provision where one owner names a price and the other owner is compelled to either purchase the first owner's shares or sell his own shares at the named price.
1 As Circuit Judge Easterbrook recognizes, "The possibility that the person naming the price can be forced either to buy or to sell keeps the first mover honest." 2 Because of their potential for achieving fair and efficient outcomes, these clauses ha ve become practically boilerplate in various legal practice areas such as real estate joint ventures.
Despite their widespread inclusion in business contracts, even the most experienced attorneys have rarely (if ever) seen a Texas Shootout clause triggered. 3 These clauses typically give the owners discretion over whether to use the Texas Shootout as the exiting mechanism. For example, the operating agreement of the Omnibus Financial Group reads:
"If for any reason any Member ('the Electing Member') is unwilling to continue to be a member of [the partnership] if another Member ('the Notified Member') is also a member of [the partnership], then the Electing Member may give the Notified Member written notice stating in such notice the value of a 1% Membership Interest ('Interest Value') whereupon the Notified Member shall, by written notice given to the Electing Member within 30 days from the date of receipt of the Electing Member's notice, elect either to purchase the Electing Member's interest in [the LLC] or to sell to the Electing Member the Notified Member's interest in [the LLC]." 4
In other words, an owner who no longer wishes to participate in the business venture has the freedom and flexibility to negotiate the breakup in other ways, without actually initiating the Texas Shootout procedure.
Our paper explores, both theoretically and experimentally, the private incentives of parties to trigger Texas Shootout clauses. We adopt a framework where two partners initially share ownership of the business assets. Later, an event occurs that makes joint ownership inefficient: the value of the underlying assets is higher if just one partner retains sole control and the other partner departs. We initially assume that the two partners are equally capable of running the firm alone. Bargaining takes a very simple form: a random process (a coin flip) determines which partner will make a takeit-or-leave-offer and which partner will receive that offer. Bargaining is frustrated by the fact that one of the partners has private information about the common underlying value of the business assets. In this setting, when triggered, a Texas Shootout constitutes an optimal exit mechanism because it removes the inefficient "status quo" of joint ownership from the bargaining table.
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Although Texas Shootout mechanisms are efficient, we demonstrate that parties are naturally reluctant to initiate or trigger them. A partner-whether informed or uninformed-can often capture greater equilibrium rents through simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell. 6 The threat to remain with the "status quo " of joint ownership is used strategically to extract rents in bargaining and, in the process, can destroy joint value by generating inefficient breakdowns. When the informed partner is the offeror, there is a unique fully-separating equilibrium where buy-sell offers are only made when the common value of the asset is in an intermediate range and the gains from trade are small. If the common value is outside of this intermediate range (or the gains from trade are large ), however, the offeror prefers to make a simple offer to buy or a simple offer to sell and bargaining failures arise. When the uninformed partner is the offeror, we show that buy-sell offers are never voluntarily made.
The reluctance of parties to trigger Texas Shootouts -and the potential inefficiencies that may arise -is illustrated by the recent takeover of beer giant Scottish & New Castle (S&N) by a consortium formed by the Danish brewer Carlsberg and the Dutch brewer Heineken. The motivation for the takeover was, apparently, Carlsberg's desire to get a 100% control over Baltic
Beverages Holding (BBH), a joint venture operation in Russia in which Carlsberg and S&N were 5 In theory, Texas Shootouts would be unnecessary for efficiency under symmetric information. Rational partners would negotiate a price for the sale of the asset rather than watching its value dissipate. 6 Suppose that it is commonly known that the joint asset is $0 if the two partners stay together, but is worth $2 with concentrated ownership. In other words, there is $2 of bargaining surplus on the table. Suppose that Partner 1 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Partner 2. The best buy-sell offer that Partner 1 could make is p = $1, giving each of the two partners half of the bargaining surplus. Partner 1 can clearly capture the entire bargaining surplus with a simple offer to buy Partner 2's stake for a penny or, analogously, to sell his stake for just under $2.
to buy or simple offers to sell their ownership stakes. 12 Computational demands on the subjects were reduced by using a simple binary setting with two asset types. We considered three different information treatments: symmetric information, asymmetric information with the uninformed party making a final offer, and asymmetric information with the informed party making a final offer. 13 In equilibrium, (1) simple offers to buy or to sell would be always chosen and (2) breakdowns would occur in the information treatment where the u ninformed party makes the final offer. The experimental results generally supported these theoretical predictions. The subjects largely avoided making buy-sell offers and inefficienc ies due to bargaining failure were observed. Moreover, although symmetric information reduced the incidence of inefficient breakdowns, it did not eliminate breakdowns entirely. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first experimental study of partnership dissolutio n mechanisms where Texas shootouts are not mandatory. Our paper also contributes to the experimental economics literature by providing the first empirical evidence on ultimatum exchange environments with endogenous offer types.
14 Our paper is part of a large literature on mechanisms for dividing valuable assets among multiple parties, a literature that includes the classic cake-cutting problem. 15 Seminal work by Crawford (1977) assesses the properties of the equilibrium of the game induced by a mandatory "divide-and-choose" method. He shows that the allocations generated by the se mechanisms are "envy-free," in the sense that neither party prefers the allocation received by the other, but they do not necessarily satisfy Pareto efficiency or equity. Crawford (1979 Crawford ( , 1980 proposes two procedures for overcoming these deficiencies: setting the offeree's payoff in case of rejection equal to a fair division (to achieve efficiency), 16 and auctioning the role of the offeror (to achieve equity).
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Using a mechanism-design approach, McAfee (1992) studies partnership dissolution mechanisms in an independent private values environment. He shows that the person receiving the 12 See Kittsteiner and Ockenfels (2006) for a discussion of the use of experimental economics methods to study market design mechanisms. 13 Note that, under simple -buy or simple -sell offers, our experimental setting resembles an ultimatum exchange environment with endogenous offer types and positive outside options. 14 Blount and Larrick (2000) study ultimatum environments with endogenous frame types (division-of-thepie and claim-from-a-common-pool frames) under complete information. We thank Rachel Croson for pointing out this paper. 15 One famous (and practical) solution to this problem is provided by the divide-and-choose method: one person divides the cake into two pieces, and the other person chooses a piece. 16 Crawford called this technique "EDDC," referring to the equal-division divide-and-choose method. 17 Bassi (2006) experimentally studies the properties of these two mechanisms. Her findings support the theoretical predictions. Note that the environment used in this study involves mandatory buy-sell mechanisms.
buy-sell offer is in a relatively advantageous position, and that these mechanisms may result in inefficient outcomes. McAfee (1992) and Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) explore alternative partnership dissolution mechanisms, such as a simultaneous sealed-bid auction where the partner with the high bid gets the partnership asset at a price equal to a pre-determined combination of the two bids. Kittsteiner et al. (2008) experimentally study the efficiency property of the buy-sell and the sealed-bid auction procedures in mandatory environments. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, they find that both procedures are efficient. In a recent theoretical work, de Frutos and Kittsteiner (2008) argue that the inefficiency of buy-sell mechanisms (McAfee, 1992) is mitigated if the parties bid to determine the offeror. Jehiel and Pauzner (2006) and Fieseler et al. (2003) analyze the partnership dissolution problem in settings characterized by interdependent values and asymmetric information. They show that efficiency is even harder to achieve in the se settings (see also Moldovanu, 2002, and Kittsteiner, 2003) . 18 None of the papers in this literature consider the strategic use of exit clauses in decentralized bargaining environments. As a result, the idea that making buy-sell offers may not be unilaterally profitable for the partners has been overlooked.
As the literature moved to the assumption of common values, some of the focus has shifted away from bargaining efficiency towards fairness considerations (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Morgan, 2003) . 19 The focus on fairness is justified, at least implicitly, by the observation that if an asset has a value that is common to all individual parties then no allocative efficiency implications are raised by an ex-post assignment of ownership to one partner or the other. In our model, however, Texas
Shootouts raise salient efficiency implications even in the context of common values. In this context shootouts restrict strategic behaviors that interfere with the allocation of the asset to one party or another when joint ownership is no longer desirable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework and presents our main theoretical result that parties tend to eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or sell. Section 3 presents experimental evidence on the behavior of economic agents in non-mandatory shootouts environments. Section 4 extends the theoretical analysis by allowing for heterogeneous abilities of partners. In this scenario, Texas shootouts are triggered by the stronger and better informed partner to extract greater value from the weaker partner. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
18 See also Minehart and Neeman (1999) and Levin and Tadelis (2005) . 19 Morgan (2003) studies a common-value framework under a more general information structure. He does not consider decentralized bargaining, simple -buy and simple -sell offers, and heterogeneous abilities. Morgan's work and our own were pursued independently. θ . Although presumably joint ownership of the business assets was originally desirable, an event has occurred that makes joint ownership inefficient. We assume that the value created by the assets is higher under the sole control of just one of the two partners, x + a, where a is strictly positive and is common knowledge. The assumption that the asset creates more value with concentrated ownership may be justified in a number of different ways. First, it may reflect an underlying moral-hazard-in-teams problem (Holmstrom, 1982) in which joint ownership leads to underinvestment relative to the socially efficient level. Second, the partnership may, by its very na ture, require investments from each partner that are duplicative at this stage in the firm's life cycle. Finally, but certainly not least likely, the partnership may be in deadlock, wherein irreconcilable differences between partners prevents the business from moving forward.
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We assume that negotiations take the following simple form: a random process (a coin flip) determines the offeror, i.e., the partner who makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the offeree (the partner who receives the offer Crawford (1977 Crawford ( , 1979 Crawford ( , and 1980 also assumes that the role of offeror is randomly determined (by the toss of an unbiased coin).
receiver the option to either buy or sell at the named price (T). 23 The prices here are normalized to represent 100% of the company's stock.
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Two environments are studied: a mandatory Texas Shootout environment and a non-mandatory Texas shootout environment. In the mandatory shootout environment, the offeror is compelled to make a buy-sell offer, and the offeree then decides whether to buy or sell at the named price. In the non-mandatory shootout environment, the offeror may choose a buy-sell offer but is not required to do so. Instead, he may choose to make a simple offer to buy the other partner's shares, a simple offer to sell his own shares, or make no offer at all. If the offeree rejects a simple offer (or if the offeror decides to make no offer), the parties remain in the inefficient status quo of joint ownership.
Note that the receiver of a buy-sell offer iT p , whether he is informed or uninformed about the value of the asset, prefers to exercise the option to buy or sell rather than remain with the status quo of joint ownership in our model. It is straightforward to establish this fact. Suppose that the offeree believes that the asset is worth x on average, so i f he rejects the buy-sell offer he receives an Therefore a risk-neutral receiver of a buy-sell offer would certainly be willing to exercise the option to either buy or sell. We will show, however, that in non-mandatory environments, the offeror, whether he is informed or uninformed about the value of the asset, will be generally hesitant to make a buy-sell offer.
We use the following notation:
is the equilibrium probability that 25 There are multiple signa ling equilibria when Partner 1, the informed partner, makes the offer.
Mandatory Texas Shootouts

Informed Offeror
Suppose that Partner 1, the informed partner, wins the coin-flip and makes a buy-sell offer p. 
In equilibrium, the partners share the surplus, a, in proportion to their initial ownership stakes.
Interestingly, the probability that a partner "wins" the shootout and is the ultimate owner of the assets is equa l to his initial equity stake. To put it somewhat differently, the pattern of ownership is "sticky" -a partner who owns a greater share of the partnership before the breakup is more likely to be the owner after the breakup. To see the intuition behind this result, consider the extreme case where Partner 2 has a 99% stake in the asset, but chooses to buy out Partner 1 with only .5
26 Morgan (2003) has a "purified" version of this result in a model that abstracts entirely from efficiency considerations. 27 Note that there are also pooling equilibria. Suppose, for example that all types offer the same buy-sell price () pExa =+ . It is rational for Partner 2 to randomize between buying and selling with probabilities 2 θ and 1 θ , respectively. Given that Partner 2 is mixing in this way, it is rational for Partner 1 to offer () pExa =+ regardless of his type. As demonstrated in the text, Partner 1 is indifferent among the different price offers.
probability (based on a flip of an evenly weighted coin). Hence, when Partner 1 names a low-ball price, he acquires an additional 99% of the asset for a discount with even odds, and risks being underpaid for just 1% of the asset with the same odds. Given that Partner 2 chooses to buy the asset with such low probability relative to his ownership interest, Partner 1 is encouraged to downwardly distort the announced asset price. Indeed, unless Partner 2 chooses to buy the asset in direct proportion to his ownership interest, Partner 1 will have incentive to misrepresent the asset's value.
Uninformed Offeror
Now suppose instead that Partner 2, the uninformed partner, makes the buy-sell offer .
2T
p Knowing the true value of the asset, x, Partner 1 will "buy" instead of "sell" if . x . This marginal benefit is relatively large (and the marginal cost relatively small) when Partner 2's initial stake, 2 θ , is large. When 2 θ is higher, Partner 2 will name a higher price and will be a net buyer with a higher probability.
Non-Mandatory Texas Shootouts
In this section, we assume that the business agreement includes a Texas Shootout clause, in which the parties have the option to use shootouts as an exit mechanism, but other mechanisms are also allowed. Hence, the offeror is not compelled to make, but may make, a Texas Shootout offer. This environment reflects real-world settings in which shootouts are generally non-mandatory. We will show that parties are hesitant to make buy-sell offers, i.e., they are "gun shy." The reason for this is that the Texas Shootout mechanism gives a large part of the bargaining surplus to the offeree, surplus that may be retained by the offeror with a simple offer to buy or a simple offer to sell. This effect is exacerbated when the offeror is uninformed, since the offeree can take full advantage of her superior informational position when deciding whether to buy or sell. As a result, inefficient breakdowns will occur. 28 Indeed, we will show that the parties' reluctance to make buy-sell offers reduces social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information.
The reluctance of the parties to make buy-sell offers is easily illustrated for the special case where x is known by both parties (i.e., a symmetric information setting = (plus a penny) or through a simple offer to sell his stake 28 The Coase conjecture, that bargaining will resolve itself in the "twinkling of an eye," does not extend to common value bargaining games, even when it is common knowledge that gains from trade exits. Vincent (1989) shows that inefficient breakdowns may persist in infinite-horizon bargaining games, and despite the common knowledge that there are gains from trade. A more familiar manifestation is Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem. Empirical evidence supports these theoretical claims (Kennan and Wilson, 1989, 1993; Cramton and Tracy, 1992, 1994) . See Ausubel et al. (2002) 
+ <
, Partner 2 strictly prefers to buy and so Partner 1 could profitably raise the price. Any probability of mixing buying and selling constitutes an equilibrium of the subgame. The payoffs of the two parties are the same whether Partner 2 buys or sells.
to Partner 2 for
(minus a penny). 30 Now let's reintroduce asymmetric information.
Informed Offeror
Suppose that Partner 1, the informed partner, can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Partner 2. We will show that Partner 1 will avoid making a buy-sell offer when the value of the asset is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low, and inefficient breakdowns will occur. In an intermediate range, however, Partner 1 may voluntarily choose to make a buy-sell offer. 
i.
If x x≤ Partner 1 offers to sell his shares to Partner 2 for
According to this proposition, Partner 1 is "gun shy, " avoiding buy-sell offers at the extremes of the distribut ion. The intuition is pretty straightforward. Suppose that x = 0, so the asset is worthless when owned jointly. Following the first part of the proposition, Partner 1 offers to sell the asset for . Partner 1 is able to extract the entire bargaining surplus, a, in this extreme case. When x rises the separating equilibrium has the 30 The reluctance to make buy-sell offers would also appear in an infinitely-repeated version of this model. To see why, suppose the partners believe that the Texas Shootout will be invoked at period t + 1, where they will split the surplus in proportion to their initial ownership stakes as described above. Partner 2's outside option, when viewed from period t, is
, where δ is the common discount factor. Partner 1 surely prefers a simple offer to buy for
to a buy-sell offer where he splits the surplus 50-50. We conjecture that this dynamic game will feature delay when the partners are privately informed about the common value of the asset. See Vincent (1989). feature that 1 () S px rises and Partner 2 randomizes between accepting and rejecting. 31 Partner 2's probability of acceptance,
, is falling in the common value of the asset, x. , is rising in x, the common value of the asset, and equal to a when x = 1.
In the middle range, however, incentive compatibility would require that a simple offer to buy or a simple offer to sell be accepted with probability less than 1 θ , leaving Partner 1 with a surplus of less than a 
is a non-empty set and Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer with positive probability in equilibrium. When
is an empty set and Partner 1 does not make a buy-sell offer in equilibrium.
Uninformed Offeror
We will now show that Partner 2, the uninformed partner, would never find it in his private interest to make a buy-sell offer -he is "gun shy. " To see why, suppose that the two partners initially have
. We know from Proposition 2 that the best buy-sell offer that
Partner 2 can make is
, where 0 x is the median of the distribution of types. The Texas Shootout is a very unattractive mechanism from Partner 2's perspective. If the asset is worth more than average -i.e., it is a "plum," 0 x x > -then Partner 1 will buy out Partner 2 at the median price. If the asset is worth less than average -i.e., it is a "lemon," 0 x x < -then Partner 1 sells out at the median price and Partner 2 is stuck with a less valuable asset. In both cases, Partner 2 is getting the "short end of the stick." When the bargaining surplus, a, is very small (so the status quo 32 When
of joint ownership is almost as efficient as concentrated ownership), then Partner 2, the uninformed partner, clearly has no incentive to make a buy-sell offer. He would rather remain with the status quo. As the bargaining surplus grows the figurative "stick" is getting longer, increasing Partner 2's incentive to make a buy-sell offer. Although Partner 2 is still getting the short end of the stick, there comes a point where he prefers the short end of the stick to having no stick at all. Taken together, the results of this section suggest that buy-sell offers are only rarely made in non-mandatory environments. Since the bargaining tactics of offerors involve simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell, breakdowns occur in equilibrium. According to the experience of practitioners, departing members of joint business ventures tend to negotiate outside of the shootout mechanism. Hence, inefficiencies may arise.
Experimental Evidence
This section reports the results f rom a series of experiments with human subjects. We investigate whether the behavior of the subjects when Texas Shootouts are no t mandatory follows the pattern predicted by the theory. Three information environments are considered: symmetric information (S), asymmetric-information/uninformed offeror (A/UO), and asymmetric-information/informed offeror (A/IO). To reduce the cognitive demands on the subjects, we adopt a simple numerical example of the binary version of the model. 33 Note that in case of simple-buy or simple-sell offers, our setting resembles an ultimatum strategic environment with positive outside options and endogenous offer types. 
Binary Example
Suppose that two partners have equal ownership stakes in the company. 35 If the partners stay together, the value of the business assets is either low (x L = 150) or high (x H = 400). Suppose further that the probabilities of encountering low and high values are 3/4 and 1/4, respectively. If sole ownership is achieved, the n the total value of the business assets is xa + , where the surplus a = 100.
Despite its simplicity, this binary setting captures the strategic environment of the more general case presented earlier.
To make the environment more natural for our subjects, we normalized the price offers to reflect just the 50% stake in the firm that would change hands (rather than maintaining the more general representation from the last section).
Consider the three information environments (symmetric information, asymmetricinformation/uninformed offeror, and asymmetric-information/informed offeror). Game theory predicts that we would only observe simple offers from the following set: {75, 175, 200, 300}.
Suppose first that the two partners are symmetrically informed about x. The offeror would either offer to buy his partner's stake for 2 x (plus a penny perhaps) or to sell his own stake for a x + 2 (minus a penny), and his partner would accept. Note that the offeror is taking the entire pie for himself, leaving no surplus for the receiver. Since x can either take on the values of 150 or 400, a 33 See Appendix B for a general analysis of the binary version of the model. 34 Few labels are used to motivate the bargaining game : "value of the business assets," "business partners," "offer to sell," "offer to buy," "partnership dissolution," and "sole ownership." The choice of labels is aligned to the real-world settings in which these mechanisms are used. Our experimental environment is an extension of Hoffman et al.'s (1994) "buyer-seller exchange environment with random entitlement," under positive outside options, endogenous offer types, and multiple rounds. Experimental work on ultimatum strategic environments under symmetric information and exchange settings conducted by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and by Hoffman et al. (1994 Hoffman et al. ( , 1996 find support to the subgame perfect equilibrium concept. As suggested by Hoffman et al. (1996) , the behavior of subjects conform the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions because the exchange environment "legitimatize[s] the property rights implied by player 1's assignment to the advantageous position of first mover" (p. 291). In fact, this exchange context elicits "common expectations on a more self-regarding offer by the first mover" (Hoffman et al., 1994; p. 351; see also David and Holt, 1993) . 35 According to Hauswald and Hege (2006) , the uninformed offeror will receive exactly 125 whether the asset value is low or high (if the asset value is high the offeree will certainly buy). If he offers 250 = T p , the offeror receives a payoff of zero when the asset value is low (since the offeree sells) and a payoff of 250 if the asset value is high, an expect payoff of 62.5. 37 Note that the uninformed partner is willing to accept these offers regardless of his beliefs about the offeror's type. This fully-separating equilibrium is supported by the following beliefs. When faced with an offer to buy (sell) the offeree believes that the asset value is high (low). He will therefore accept any offer to buy (sell) , and randomizes 50/50 between buying and selling. This gives the offeror exactly 50% of the bargaining surplus. When faced with a buy-sell offer below 125, the offeree believes the asset value is low and buys. This gives the offeror even less than 50% of the surplus. An analogous statement could be made for a buy-sell offer above 250. 38 This is because the distribution is binary. With intermediate types, buy-sell offers may be chosen by inf ormed offerors as we saw earlier for continuous distributions. 39 The mode offers made by the subjects in Hoffman et al.'s (1994) buyer-seller exchange environment with random entitlement represented a 30-70 and 40-60 splits of the surplus. ultimatum game literature, we would expect subjects in our environment to propose divisions of the surplus that are consistent with these ranges.
To reduce the computational burden on our subjects, we limited the offeror's choice to a set of six offer prices (identical across conditions). In particular, we modified the equilibrium offer prices described above to include behaviorally-relevant divisions of the surplus. We added ε to the equilibrium simple offers to buy, and subtracted e from the equilibrium simple offers to sell. In to buy or simple offers to sell in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. When x = 150, for example, the offeror will either offer to buy for 105 or offer to sell for 145 and the offeree will accept. The offeror's payoff is 145 and the offeree's payoff is 105. Now consider the bottom half of the table.
With asymmetric information, inefficiencies arise when the uninformed partner is the offeror.
There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the uninformed offeror makes a simple offer to buy for 105. When x = 400, the informed offeree rejects this offer and the parties remain in the 40 Note that the choice of ε and the choice of the few labels used in our experiments also follow some of the features used by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) . In contrast to other experimental studies on ultimatum games in which subjects are supposed to split a $10 pie, in Fouraker and Siegel's (1963) environment, all bargaining is described as a buyer-seller transaction, in which the seller makes an ultimatum (take-it-or-leave-it) price offer to the buyer, the buyer decides a quantity (that can be zero), and, the equilibrium payoffs imply a 27-73 split.
inefficient status quo of joint ownership. 41 When the informed partner is the offeror, on the other hand, there is a separating equilibrium where the offeror makes a simple offer to sell for 145 or a simple offer to buy for 230, for low and high asset values, respectively. 42 In sum, buy-sell offers are never made in equilibrium; and, efficiency is always achieved in symmetric information settings, and inefficiency occurs in asymmetric information environments in which the uninformed party is the offeror and the value of the asset is high.
Games and Sessions
Subjects played 8 practice rounds 43 and 16 actual rounds 44 using network computer terminals.
Before the beginning of the first actual round, the computer randomly assigned a role to the subjects: Player 1 or Player 2 (Player 1 was the offeror in the S and A/IO and S conditions, and offeree in the A/UO condition). Before the beginning of each actual round, the computer randomly formed pairs. 45 Then, the computer randomly chose the value of the business assets (low with probability .75 and high with probability .25). This value was revealed to both players in the symmetric information condition (S) and was revealed only to Player 1 in the asymmetric information conditions.
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The subjects played a two-stage game. In the first stage, the offeror made a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other subject, the offeree. 47 The offeror chose the type of offer (a simple-buy offer, a 41 The offer to buy for 105 is accepted if and only if the assets have low value, giving the offeror a payoff of (.75)(250-105) + (.25)(200) = 158.75. One can easily verify that this is better for the offeror than any other offer to buy within the offer set. Within this set, the best offer to sell is a price of 145. This offer would always be accepted, but gives the offeror a strictly lower payoff. As above, the best buy-sell offer is a price of 125, but this gives the offeror a payoff of just 125. 42 As above, these offers would be accepted by the uniformed offeree regardless of his beliefs about the value of the assets. This equilibrium gives the offeror 70% of the bargaining surplus, more than the 50% that would be obtained through buy-sell offers. 43 The purpose of these practice rounds was to allow subjects to become familiar with the structure of the game, with the consequences of their choices and the choices of the other players, and with the likelihood of confronting low and high types of business assets. During the practice rounds, subjects experienced each role four times. 44 Interaction between players was done through a computer terminal, and therefore, players were completely anonymous to one another. Hence, this experimental environment did not permit the formation of reputations. Given the randomization process used to form pairs, and the diversity of offer types and prices that subjects confronted (due to the heterogeneity of offer types and pric es), the sixteen actual rounds do not represent stationary repetitions of the game. Consequently, we can treat each round as a one-shot experience. 45 Subjects were not paired with the same partner in two immediately consecutive rounds. 46 It was common knowledge that Player 1 received this information. 47 In the A/UO condition, Pla yer 2 (the uninformed player) was the offeror; and, in the S and A/IO condition, Pla yer 1 (the informed player) was the offeror.
simple-sell offer, or a buy-sell offer) 48 and the offer price. The offer price was restricted to be chosen from the set {105, 125, 145, 230, 250, 270}. 49 The terms of the offer (type of offer and price) were then revealed to the offeree. In the second stage, the offeree was required to respond to the offer. In case of a simple-buy or a simple-sell offer, she chose between accepting and or rejecting the offer; in the case of a buy-sell offer, she chose between buying and selling at the named price. 50 We ran twelve 120-minute sessions of 6 to 12 subjects each (4 sessions per condition; 116 subjects in total) 51 at the University of Alberta School of Business labs. The subject pool (undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Alberta) received the ir monetary payoffs in cash ($5 participation fee and $17 game earnings, on average) at the end of the session. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics per experimental condition. 53 The inefficiency rate in the last column is defined as the percentage of total pairs in which rejection occurred, i.e., percentage of total pairs that remained in an inefficient joint ownership. The rejection rate of a simple-buy (or a simple-sell) offer is defined as the percentage of total pairs in which the offeree received a simplebuy ( or simple-sell) offer and rejected it. The buy rate of a buy-sell offer is defined as the percentage of total pairs in which the offeree received a buy-sell offer and decided to buy.
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Information about the mode and mean offers is also provided.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
48 In order to reduce the computational costs on subjects, and given that making no offer is a strictly dominated strategy for the offeror, we omitted this option. 49 This set was the same for all conditions. 50 See Appendix C for a sample of the instructions for the A/IO environment. A complete set of instructions and software screens are available upon request. 51 The number of subjects and observations (number of subjects, number of pairs for the 16 rounds) per condit ion is as follows: (38, 304), (36, 288) and (42, 336) , for the S, A/UO, and A/IO conditions, respectively. In addition to these sessions, we ran several pilot sessions. 52 We used a laboratory currency called the "token" (the conversion rate token/dollars was informed to the subjects). 53 Given the consistency of the aggregate data across rounds since early stages, we decided to include the 16 rounds in our analysis. Note that the qualitative results still hold when only the last 8 rounds of play are considered. 54 The frequency, rejection, and buy rates per offer type refer to all prices proposed by the offerors under the specific offer type.
Our results indicate that simple-buy and simple-sell offers are generally chosen in nonmandatory shootouts environments. When both partners were symmetrically informed about the value of the business assets, 94 and 91% of all offers made were simple-buy or simple-sell offers (for low and high asset values, respectively). 55 When information was asymmetric, 84% of uninformed offerors chose simple-buy or simple-sell offers, and 62 and 72% of informed offerors chose simple-buy or simple-sell offers (for low and high asset values, respectively).
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Our findings also suggest that inefficient breakdowns occur in non-mandatory shootouts environments, even in case of symmetric information. 57 As predicted by the theory, the lowest rate of breakdown was observed when the players were symmetrically informed. The inefficiency rate under symmetric information was 15% (pooled data on asset values). 58 The fact that the rejection 55 It is interesting to note that when the offeror chose to make an off-equilibrium buy-sell offer instead, he made the expected buy-sell offer of 125 in 92% of the instances when the asset value was low, and the expected buy-sell offer of 250 in 100% of the instances when the asset value was high. So although making a buy-sell offer is an off-the-equilibrium-path strategy, the subjects apparently had a basic understanding of its properties. 56 Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) study ultimatum games under incomplete information and divide-the-pie environments. They suggest that the offeror's proposal might be based on her expectation about the acceptance level, and on her aspirations (minimum acceptable payoff). In case of ultimatum games under complete information, Hoffman et al. (1994) states that the offeror's subjective probability about the acceptance of offer captures her expectations. Extending these claims to our environment, we can hypothesize that the choice of off-equilibrium buy-sell offers might obey to the offeror's expectation about the acceptance of a simple offer to buy or to sell, and her aspirations (to obtain a payoff at least equal to 125). Pessimistic expectations could be reinforced by the observation of rejection of simple offers to buy or to sell (see discussion of inefficiency below). Note that under symmetric information and off-equilibrium beliefs about acceptance of a simple -buy or sell offer, only buy-sell offers involve certainty about both parties' payoffs. Then, the choice of off-equilibrium buy-sell offers in those environments might also reflect risk-averse attitudes on offerors. Finally note that the choice of off-equilibrium buy-sell offers might obey to cognitive limitations that preclude offerors from predicting the effects of the more complex simple offers to buy or to sell (see Blount and Lerrick, 2000) . 57 Inefficiency rates are equal to .14, .24, and .26 were observed in case of the symmetric, uninformedofferor, and informed-offeror conditions, respectively (under a low asset value). Similarly, in case of a high asset value, the inefficiencies rates are equal to .16, .51, and .39, for the symmetric, uninformed-offeror, and informed-offeror conditions, respectively. 58 This inefficiency rate is 76% higher than the one observed in Hoffman et al. (1994) under a random entitlement and exchange environment (8.5%). Three possible features of our design might explain this difference. First, our setting involves endogenous offer types. The presence of buy-sell offers, and their intrinsic equitable -split quality, might elicit fairness considerations on offerees. Second, our environment involves positive outside options (not present in Hoffman et al., 1994) . In Knetz and Camerer's (1994) experiments on ultimatum games with positive outside options (divide-the-pie environment), nearly half of the offers were rejected (a rejection rate 50% higher than in previous ultimatum game experiments). They suggest that outside options induce subjects to "'egocentrically' apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which create persistent disagreement" (p.65). Third, our environment involves not only proposals made by "sellers" (simple -sell offers) but also proposals made by "buyers" (simple -buy offers). " [I] t is the seller who is thought to be justified in naming a price" (Hoffman et al., 1994; p. 369 ). Then, rates of simple-buy and simple-sell offers in symmetric information settings are positive rather than zero (as the theory predicts) suggests fairness considerations on offerees. 59 Also as predicted by the theory, the highest inefficiency rate was observed when the uninformed player made the offers and the value of the business assets was high (51%). The most common proposal in this environment was a simple offer to buy for 105. Not surprisingly, this offer was rejected 100% the time by the informed offeree when the asset value was high. 60 Note that the high rejection rates of simple-buy and simple-sell offers in the asymmetric-info rmation environments might be due, in part, to offers that are off the equilibrium path. 61 When offerors made the equilibrium offers in the experimental sessions, these offers were generally accepted (i.e., the offerees' responses followed the equilibrium point predictions stated in Table 1 ).
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Next, we will use regression analysis to more thoroughly test the conclusions from our visual analysis of the effects of symmetric information on efficiency. We take pairs of conditions and weaker "legitimization" of the role of offeror might be observed in an exchange environment in which the buyer is the first mover, and hence, higher rejection rates might occur. Our results confirm these claims: the rejection rates of simple offers to sell and to buy are equal to 9% and 21%, respectively (pooled data on asset values) in symmetric information environments. 59 For the case of simple -buy offers, the rejection rates are 19 and 25%, for low and high values of the business assets, respectively; for the case of simple -sell offers, on the other hand, the rejection rates are 11 and 4%, for low and high values of the business assets, respectively. 60 The rejection rate of all simple -buy offers (pooled data on offer prices) is 97%. See Table 2 . 61 These off-equilibrium simple -buy or simple -sell offers might suggest computational limitations in dealing with complex asymmetric -information environments. Importantly , in case of the informed-offeror condition, some of the off-equilibrium offers (especially in case of high-asset values) suggest greediness. This behavior is not generally observed under symmetric information. Previous work on ultimatum games under asymmetric information suggests that proposers might act with greater impunity in environments in which the responders do not know the size of the pie. Indeed, Croson's (1996) study on ultimatum games with uninformed offerees finds that proposers offer significantly less when they know that responders have no knowledge of the pie size. 62 In fact, (i) under the A/UO condition, simple -buy equilibrium offers equal to 105 were accepted 83% of the time in case of low asset value (and, as predicted by the theory, always rejected in case of high asset value); and, (ii) under the A/IO condition and low asset value, the offerees accepted simple -sell equilibrium offers equal to 145 in 80% of the cases; and, under a hig h asset value, they accepted simple -buy equilibrium offers equal 230 in 100% of the cases. Note that the positive rejection rates under the A/UO condition and low asset value might suggest fairness considerations on offerees.
estimate probit models. 63 Each probit model includes a treatment dummy variable as its regressor.
64 Table 3 indicates that symmetric-information significantly reduces the likelihood of inefficiency in 6 and 4 percentage points, with respect to the uninformed offeror and informed offeror environments, respectively (p = .089 and p = .001).
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Finally note that, although our setting involves an ultimatum strategic environment with positive outside options and endogenous offer types, our findings are aligned with seminal papers on ultimatum environments under exchange settings (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Hoffman et al., 1996 Hoffman et al., , 1994 . Indeed, our findings under symmetric information also provide support to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept. As predicted by the theory, 83% of subjects made simple-buy equilibrium offers equal to 105 or simple-sell equilibrium offers equal to 145, and 84% of these offers were accepted (under a low asset value). 66 Notably, this behavior emerged since early rounds and was consistent across rounds. These results suggest that our experimental environment legitimatized the assignment of the advantageous role of offeror under symmetric information (and hence, reduced the presence of fairness considerations on offerors and offerees). 67 However, the strictly positive rejection rates of equilibrium simple-buy and simple-sell offers indicate that 63 Note that, within a session, each person plays in 16 rounds and interacts with other players during the session. Our regression analysis involves robust standard errors which account for the possible dependence of observations within session. 64 The treatment dummy variable is constructed as follows. For example, for the case of the probit model that evaluates the effect of symmetric -information on efficiency by considering the symmetric and uninformedofferors environments, the dummy variable will take a value equal to 1 if the observation pertains to the S condition, and a value equal to 0 if the observation pertains to the A/UO condition. The data for the A/UO and S conditions are pooled to estimate this probit model. Marginal effects of treatments are reported here. 65 We also conducted regression analyses to evaluate the effects of symmetric information on the likelihood of rejection of simple -buy and simple -sell offers and on the likelihood of buy-sell offers. Our findings suggest that (i) symmetric information significantly reduces the likelihood of rejection in 7 percentage points, with respect to the uninformed offeror and informed offeror environments (p = .043 and p < .001, respectively); and, (ii) symmetric information significantly reduces the likelihood of buy-sell offers in 3 and 7 percentage points, with respect to the uniformed offeror and informed offeror conditions, respectively (p = .050 and p < .001). Note that regression analysis also suggests that the uninformed offeror environment significantly reduces the likelihood of buy-sell offers in 20 percentage points, with respect to an informed offeror environment (p = .001). Finally note that most qualitative results still hold when only the last 8 rounds of play are considered (except for the effect of symmetric information on the likelihood of buy-sell offers with respect to the uninformed offeror condition, which is not significant). 66 Similarly, under a high asset value, 74% of subjects made simple -buy offers equal to 230 or simple -sell offers equal to 270, and 89% of these offers were accepted. 67 Note that, the 50-50 split (an offer price equal to 125 or 250, for low and high asset values, respectively; symmetric information) was chosen only 11% of the time (pooled data on asset values) in our study, while approximately 18% of the time in Hoffman et al. (1994) . In contrast to these findings, the 50-50 split was chosen, on average, 40% of the time in previous experiments on ultimatum games under a divide-the-pie environment.
fairness considerations might emerge even in environments where the right to be the offeror is legitimized.
Heterogeneous Abilities: An Extension
In this section, we consider the possibility that Partner 1, the better informed partner, is also in a better position to run the firm alone. 68 Formally, we assume that Partner 1 will generate value x + a if he owns the asset, while Partner 2 can do no better as a sole owner than the status quo of joint ownership, x. In real-world settings, as mentioned before, managing investors (general partners) have stronger control rights over the business assets than non-managing investors (limited partners) and are more likely to participate in the business activities. Then, they might be not only more familiar about the value of the business assets but also more capable to run the business. 
Partner 2 is in a particularly vulnerable position when making a buy-sell offer in this new setting. It is useful to recall our earlier metaphor where Partner 2 breaks a stick into two pieces and then Partner 1 can choose which piece to take. As before, Partner 1 (the better informed partner) will keep the longer piece for himself. But Partner 2 is even worse off than before because in addition to getting the short piece of the stick, he derives no benefit from sole ownership relative to the status quo. Partner 1, on the other hand, is in a particularly strong position to make a buy-sell offer. In the fully separating equilibrium, Partner 2 is rendered indifferent between buying Partner 68 There are additional normative implications when the partners' competences are asymmetric. The question becomes not only whether the partnership is dissolved (avoidance of the status quo) but who gets sole control (allocative efficiency). 69 Differences in individual capacity with respect to the asset may also result from the refusal from key suppliers and customers to deal with the other partner for non-productive reasons.
1's stake and selling his own stake and receives none of the surplus. Partner 1, on the other hand, is able to extract much more of the surplus through the Texas Shootout. The second part of Proposition 5 may be surprising. Formally, suppose that Partner 1 is trying to decide between a buy-sell offer and a simple offer to buy the asset. 70 The fully-revealing price offered in these two scenarios would be exactly the same:
The scenarios differ, however, in Partner 2's response to the offers. Suppose that Partner 1 offers to buy for is easier to achieve with buy-sell offers than with simple offers to buy. In other words, Partner 1 succeeds in acquiring the asset more often when he makes a buy-sell offer than when he makes a simple offer to buy.
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Proposition 6: Suppose that the partners have heterogeneous abilities to run the firm alone. Social welfare is (weakly) higher when buy-sell offers are mandatory rather than non-mandatory.
Unlike the analysis in the main section of the paper, the Texas Shootout does not lead to the first-best outcome when partners have heterogeneous abilities. It is socially efficient for Partner 1 to 70 The simple offer to buy the asset necessarily dominates a simple offer to sell the asset to Partner 2. This is because Partner 2 creates no surplus from ownership, so there would be no surplus for Partner 1 to extract by selling to Partner 2. 71 See Appendix A for a complete proof of the proposition.
own the asset, but in equilibrium either partner may end up with ownership and control of the firm.
Never-the-less, the Texas Shootout leads to a weakly higher level of social welfare. When buy-sell offers remain non-mandatory, Partner 2 will forego the buy-sell offer in favor of a simple offer to sell his shares to Partner 1. Although this private decision creates more profits for Partner 2, the gain is more than offset by the losses to Partner 1. Intuitively, if Partner 2 were forced to make a buy-sell offer instead then he would be more "generous" in his offer to avoid the downside of buying Partner 1's shares at an inflated price and Partner 1 would buy with a higher probability.
Conclusions
Proponents of the use of Texas Shootout clauses as exit mechanisms advocate their potential for achieving fair and efficient outcomes. Although non-mandatory shootout clauses (under which, the partners may, but are not required to, make buy-sell offers) are commonly inc luded in the operating agreements of closely-held business ventures, these clauses are rarely triggered. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explore, theoretically and experimentally, the private incentives of the parties to trigger a n on-mandatory Texas Shootout clause in a decentralized bargaining environment. Ours paper is also the first experimental study on ultimatum exchange environments with endogenous offer types.
In our theoretical framework, we assume that both partners are equally capable of running the business alone. The dissolution of the partnership is assumed to be jointly efficient. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information -one partner had better information about the asset value than the other. Buy-sell offers are jointly desirable in this setting because they lead to immediate dissolution of the partnership with one partner owning the asset and the other partner walking away with cash in her pocket. Yet this jointly efficient outcome is elusive because the partners are reluctant to make buy-sell offers. We show that, in an attempt to grab bargaining surplus, the partners will choose to forgo the Texas Shootout in favor of simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell. The downside of these bargaining tactics is that the rejection of these simple offers -and rejection does arise in equilibrium -leads the partners to remain in an ongoing partnership that would be more valuable dissolved.
In addition to the anecdotal support discussed in the introduction, our theoretical insights are largely confirmed in the laboratory. When given the option to negotiate outside of the Texas Shootout mechanism, the experimental subjects tend to avoid making buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy the other partner's stake or simple offers to sell their own stakes. This leads to bargaining failures, since these simple offers to buy or sell are rejected a significant fraction of the time. Although these inefficiencies are more pronounced in the presence of asymmetric information, we observe bargaining failures in s ymmetric information s ettings as well. The theoretical and experimental findings presented here provide an efficiency rationale for adopting mandatory Texas Shootout clauses in business ventures where the owners have similar abilities to run the firm and similar financial resources.
Texas shootout clauses should be adopted with caution when owners do not have equal financial capabilities. Indeed, liquidity constraints faced by one partner can create an advantage for the other partner to acquire the assets at a predatory price. 72 When one partner's superior financial capacity creates a bargaining disadvantage for the other partner, it is not uncommon for the disadvantaged partner to claim improper exclusion or foreclosure. Courts are attentive to these complaints, treating buy-sell offers as only presumptively fair and allowing background fiduciary obligations to limit, though imperfectly, predatory buyouts. Shareholder agreements that give sufficient time to respond to a buy-sell offer and arrange finance and administrative matters might be recommended.
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Extensions to our work might consider in greater detail the predatory potential of Texas shootouts.
Future work m ight also explore other reasons for which Texas shootouts are included in business agreements. For instance, Texas shootout clauses may serve as a mechanism for bringing reluctant parties to the bargaining table (Carey, 2005) . By bringing partners together face-to-face, certain deadlock situations might be resolved without an actual dissolution of the partnership (i.e., without triggering the shootout clause). These, and other extensions, remain fruitful areas for future research.
72 Financial advisors warn shareholders about the advantage of the party with the "deeper pockets" under shootout clauses ( http://www.kpmg.ca/en/services/enterprise/issuesWealthShareholder.html). S uppose the "deep pockets" partner, Partner 1, knows about Partner 2's liquidity constraint. Then, Partner 1 might trigger the shootouts by proposing a price lower than the value of Partner 2's assets under joint ownership -a predatory offer. Although Partner 2 would prefer to remain with the status quo of joint ownership, the rules of the standard Texas shootout clause (together with her liquidity constraint) would effectively force her to sell her own stake to Partner 1. 73 Practitioners consider that between 30 to 60 days is a reasonable period of time to finance and respond to a "shotgun" (http://www.kpmg.ca/en/services/enterprise/issuesWealthShareholder.html). Shareholder agreements that stipulate that the buyout can be funded over time or with profits from the ongoing business might reduce these predatory effects (Stephanie Clifford, Inc. Magazine, November 2006; hpttp://www.inc.com/magazine). Companies that help entrepreneurs react quickly to an executed shootouts clause (i.e., venture capital firms that provide funds to the partners) could also attenuate these effects. See, for instance, the case of the firm called Shotgun Fund in Canada (http://www.shotgunfund.com/index.htm). Note: (a) Offeror and offeree are informed players in the symmetric-information condition. Note: (a) For each condition and offer type, mode and mean prices are presented in the first and second rows of the price column, respectively; standard deviations are presented in parentheses, and sample sizes (number of pairs for the 16 rounds) are in brackets; for each condition and offer type, the frequency, rejection, and buy rates refer to all prices offered; (b) mean payoffs correspond to the offeror's and offeree's payoffs, respectively; (c) for the A/UO condition, the information related to the offer type and price are the same under both initial values; (d) for the A/IO condition and simple-sell offer type, prices 105, 125 and 270 were the only prices chosen and each price was chosen once. The columns report the change in the likelihood of inefficiency due to symmetric-information (probit analysis using sessions as clusters; marginal effects reported); robust standard errors are in parentheses; * * * and * denote significance at the 1% and 10%, respectively; observations correspond to number of pairs.
Appendix A: Proofs
This appendix presents the proofs to propositions and lemmas presented in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1:
In any separating equilibrium it must be the case that 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Rearranging expression (1),
Differentiating and setting the derivative equal to zero at
. The second derivative is negative so we have a global maximum. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We will begin by proving that the offers and acceptance probabilities described in the proposition are, indeed, a fully-separating equilibrium. Then we will prove uniqueness. (Again, Partner 2 would be indifferent between selling his stake to Partner 1 and remaining with the status quo.) Partner 2's equilibrium strategies (defined in Proposition 3) are a best response to Partner 1's offers. Since Partner 1's offer is perfectly revealing of his type and the offers make Partner 2 indifferent, Partner 2 is willing to randomize between accepting and rejecting (in the case of simple offers to buy or sell) and between buying and selling (in the case of the buy-sell offer).
The fully revealing offer schedule is incentive compatible for Partner 1. First, suppose that Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer,
As described in the proof and text associated with Proposition 1, this is incentive compatible for type x since Partner 2 is mixing according to
Next, suppose Partner 1 is of type x. Partner 1's payoff from making an offer to buy Partner 2's stake for 1 () Taken together, these results prove that the equilibrium has either two intervals where the first features offers to sell and the second offers to buy, or three regions where the middle region features buy-sell offers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that Partner 2 makes a buy-sell offer. From Proposition 2, if T 2 x x < then Partner 1 sells his stake to Partner 2. Partner 2's ex post surplus is:
, then Partner 1 buys Partner 2's stake and
Partner 2's expected surplus from the buy-sell offer is therefore:
This is clearly negative when âa < as defined in the proposition, and is positive otherwise. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We will first prove that Partner 2 would prefer to make a simple offer to buy the asset rather than remain with the status quo. Suppose that Partner 2 makes a simple offer to buy the asset from Partner 1 for 
Differentiating this expression gives the slope of this function: 
Partner 1's payoff must be maximized when xx = % . Setting this expression equal to zero when xx = % gives us the first-order differential equation:
Differentiating this expression with respect to z and setting the derivative equal to zero shows that the cutoff satisfies
. This implies that Partner 2's expected payoff from making a buy-sell offer is lower now than it would be making the very same offer when Partner 2 is an equally capable manager as Partner 1. So Partner 2 would never make a buy-sell offer.
In the case of a buy-sell offer, Partner 2 sells the asset to Partner 1 with probability ) x ( . Partner 1 receives surplus a in this case as well. Partner 1's preference hinges on the relative probability of getting the surplus, a. Both of these probabilities equal 1 when x = 1, giving Partner 1 exactly the same surplus a. But for values of x below 1, the buy-sell offer yields a higher probability that Partner 1 will ultimately own the assets and a higher corresponding surplus for Partner 1.
1 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
First, when Partner 1 makes the offer he will choose to make the buy-sell offer. Making buy-sell offers mandatory when Partner 1 is making the offer has no affect on the outcome. Making the buy-sell offer mandatory does make a difference when Partner 2 makes the offer. To show that social welfare is higher under the shootout, we need to calculate Partner 2's favorite offer to sell and the associated social surplus.
If Partner 1 has type x and he rejects the offer then Partner 
As in the proof of the last claim, this gives us the differential equation 
